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Mays v. City of Flint, Michigan, 871 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2017)
Nathan A. Burke
In Mays v. City of Flint Michigan, Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality employees removed a class action against them in
the Michigan state court to federal court under the federal-officer removal
statute. This court ruled in favor of the residents of Flint, determining that
the federal officer removal statute did not give the federal court
jurisdiction over a state agency simply because the agency must follow
federal rules. The court held that Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality employees could not have been “acting under” the federal
government even though the state agency’s enforcement authority could
be trumped by the EPA. In addition, the court held that a state law tort
claim relying on the violation of federal law is not a substantial question
of federal law. This ruling reinforced the ability of individuals to hold their
local agencies accountable in local courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mays v. City of Flint, Michigan arose out of the poor condition of drinkingwater in Flint, Michigan.1 The plaintiffs were Flint residents who also
sought to represent others harmed by the Flint drinking-water crisis.2 The
defendants were state officials from Flint (collectively “City”) and
employees of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(collectively “MDEQ”).3 After the plaintiffs filed their complaint in
Michigan state court, MDEQ filed a removal notice in federal district court
on two grounds: (1) the federal-officer removal statute,4 and (2) federalquestion jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.5 The plaintiffs opposed
removal, and their motion to remand back to state court was granted by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.6 On
review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision, holding that state court was the proper forum
because MDEQ failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that federal
court jurisdiction was proper.7
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2014, the City switched its drinking water source from
the City of Detroit to the Flint River to save money.8 Despite a Citycommissioned report in 2011 that concluded the Flint River water was
“highly corrosive and unsafe” for drinking, MDEQ failed to introduce
corrosion-control treatment to the water.9 The plaintiffs contend that
MDEQ and the City knew that changing the Flint drinking water source
would cause substantial negative health effects, but did so anyway for
fiscal purposes.10 The plaintiffs also assert that after months of citizen
complaints, MDEQ and the City failed to inform the public of health issues
caused by the drinking water and did nothing to remedy the water
quality.11
In January 2016, several of the plaintiffs filed a class action
lawsuit against the City and MDEQ in Genesee Circuit Court.12 The
plaintiffs alleged that MDEQ “deliberately ignored” information about the
unsafe, corrosive nature of the water, and “falsely reassured the public…
that the water was safe to drink.”13 The complaint contained “state-law
claims of gross negligence, fraud, assault and battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”14
In April 2016, MDEQ filed a notice of removal in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.15 In response, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case back to state court.16 The
plaintiffs’ motion to remand was granted, and MDEQ appealed the
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.17
III. ANALYSIS
The central question before the court was whether the district
court properly remanded the case to the Genesee County Circuit Court
instead of allowing removal to federal court.18 Removal is proper when the
party seeking removal meets its burden of showing that the federal court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue.19 Here, MDEQ
asserted two grounds for why federal jurisdiction was proper: (1) the
actions of MDEQ were taken under the direction of the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), therefore invoking the federal-officer
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removal statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); and (2) the complaint
involved issues entitling MDEQ to federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1441.20
A. The Federal-Officer Removal Statute
The federal-officer removal statute allows civil actions to be
removed to federal court when the defendant is a federal officer.21 The
statute also allows other defendants, such as MDEQ, to remove lawsuits
from state court to federal district court when the defendant establishes:
(1) they “acted under” a federal officer; (2) the action was “performed
under color of federal office”; and (3) the defendant raises a “colorable
federal defense.”22 The court primarily focused on whether MDEQ “acted
under” the EPA when they caused the alleged harm.23
MDEQ argued that it acted under a federal officer because it was
sued for actions taken while under the EPA’s control.24 The EPA delegated
enforcement to MDEQ to implement the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule
(“LCR”) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).25 The defendants
argued that because MDEQ mandatorily reported compliance with SDWA
and LCR to the EPA, MDEQ was “acting under” the EPA.26 MDEQ felt
that the EPA’s ability to withdraw MDEQ’s primary enforcement
authority of these regulations also indicated that the EPA had control over
MDEQ.27 In addition, MDEQ asserted that the emergency order issued by
the EPA to MDEQ in January 2016, which directed MDEQ to take specific
actions in relation to the water quality crisis, proved MDEQ “acted under”
the EPA and satisfied the federal-officer removal statute.28
The court rejected MDEQ’s argument for two primary reasons.29
First, the court found that the relationship between MDEQ and the EPA
could not be accurately described as “acting under” for the purpose of the
statute.30 In the most recent Supreme Court discussion of the statute,
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., the Court explained that “[s]imply
complying with a regulation is insufficient, even if the regulatory scheme
is ‘highly detailed’ and the defendant's ‘activities are highly supervised
and monitored.’”31 The Court in Watson also indicated that the federal
government must act as the defendant’s superior to satisfy the “acting
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under” requirement.32 In cases where a non-federal government defendant
was successfully removed to district court in other circuit courts, this court
found an agreement between the parties that specified the inferior-superior
relationship between the defendant and the federal government.33 Here,
the court concluded the defendant’s mandatory compliance reports were
not enough to satisfy the phrase “acting under.”34 MDEQ and the EPA had
“no contract, no employer/employee relationship, nor any other indication
of a principal/agent arrangement.”35 The EPA was also not involved in
approving the decision to switch Flint’s water supply.36 The court agreed
that the defendant’s clearest indicator that MDEQ may have acted on
behalf of the EPA was the EPA-issued emergency order on January 21,
2016.37 However, the court noted that the order was issued two days after
the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and therefore it had no impact on the
actions that the plaintiffs challenged.38 The court found that the EPA’s
ability to intervene if a state failed to meet regulatory requirements was
not convincing because the state retains its rights to enforce its own laws
until that state failed.39 The plaintiffs’ complaint arose from actions by
MDEQ while the state was enforcing its own laws and regulations.40
Therefore, the court concluded that MDEQ was not “acting under” the
EPA.41
The court also rejected MDEQ’s argument because MDEQ was
not the type of defendant the federal-officer removal statute was intended
to protect.42 The federal-officer removal statute was written to protect
federal agents enforcing federal policies from potential bias in state
courts.43 The court felt that there was no reason for the local courts to be
biased toward MDEQ because it was not enforcing the federal SDWA;
rather, MDEQ was enforcing Michigan’s own version of the federal law.44
The court noted that the defendants in all three cases Watson cited
to support its broad interpretation of “acting under” were federal officers
or employees of a federal officers.45 In this case, however, the defendants
were state officials sued under state tort law for actions taken while
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enforcing state law.46 The court found that the federal-officer removal
statute was not enacted to protect the type of defendant in this case, and
that precedent did not allow the court to define “acting under” so broadly
as to include MDEQ’s actions in relation to the EPA.47
B. Federal Question Removal
28 U.S.C. § 1441 allows removal to district court when the statelaw claim contains a federal issue that is: (1) necessarily raised; (2)
actually disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) “capable of resolution in federal
court without disrupting the federal-state balance.”48 MDEQ argued that
that because the plaintiffs’ complaint cited the LCR and SDWA to
establish that MDEQ breached its duties, federal interpretation issues were
implicated.49 However, the court stated that a state tort claim relying on
the violation of a federal statute as an element of the tort is “insufficiently
‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”50 In addition,
situations where Congress has not provided a private right of action in
federal law are less likely to favor removal.51 Because the plaintiffs’ claims
only relied on federal law to prove elements of torts and there is no private
right of action under SDWA or LCR, the court concluded that there was
no federal question jurisdiction in this case.52
IV. CONCLUSION
In Mays v. City of Flint, Mich., the court ruled in favor of Flint
residents, determining that the district court properly held that it did not
have jurisdiction over the complaint filed against MDEQ. The court held
that MDEQ was not “acting under” the EPA in accordance with the
federal-removal statute when it made the decision to change the drinkingwater source. Although the court noted that a state officer has never been
able to invoke the federal officer removal statute in the past, the court
seemed convinced that a federal order to a state agency, like the emergency
order issued by the EPA in this case, could allow federal officer removal
for state officers. The complaint also did not raise substantial federal
issues, even though the plaintiffs’ tort claims relied on violations of federal
law.
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